The impacts of taxes on firm entry rates along state borders by Duncan, Kevin D.
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2016
The impacts of taxes on firm entry rates along state
borders
Kevin D. Duncan
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Duncan, Kevin D., "The impacts of taxes on firm entry rates along state borders" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 15693.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/15693
The impacts of taxes on firm entry rates along state borders
by
Kevin D. Duncan
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Major: Economics
Program of Study Committee:
Georgeanne Artz, Major Professor
Brent Kreider
David Keiser
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2016
Copyright c© Kevin D. Duncan, 2016. All rights reserved.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHAPTER 3. THEORY & METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
0.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
0.2 Variables and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
0.2.1 Matching Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
0.2.2 Firm Entry Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
0.2.3 Tax Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
0.2.4 Additional Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
0.2.5 Preliminary Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
0.3 Empirical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
0.3.1 Regression Discontinuity Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
0.3.2 Sensitivity Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
0.3.3 Sub-sample Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
APPENDIX A. DATA & TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
iii
LIST OF TABLES
Table A.1 Generating Subject Neighbor Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table A.2 Generating Subject Neighbor Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table B.1 Summary Table for Total Firm Births . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table B.2 Regression Discontinuity Models for Total Firm Births . . . . . . . . . 28
Table B.3 F-Tests for Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Total Firm Start Ups 29
Table B.4 Extended Bandwidth Discontinuity Models for Total Firm Births . . . 30
Table B.5 F-Tests for Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Extended Bandwith
Total Firm Start Ups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table B.6 Not Symmetric Effects for Total Firm Births . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table B.7 F-Tests for Symmetry of Coefficients for Total Firm Start Ups . . . . . 33
Table B.8 MSA Estates for Total Firm Births . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table B.9 F-Tests for Density Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Total Firm
Start Ups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Table B.10 Psuedo-RD for Stability over Time for Total Firm Births Pt I . . . . . 35
Table B.11 Psuedo-RD for Stability over Time for Total Firm Births Pt II . . . . . 36
Table B.12 Results for Firm Entry across NAICS Subcodes for Total Firm Births . 37
Table B.13 Counties with Income Tax Agreements for Total Firm Births . . . . . 38
Table B.14 F-Tests for Recipricol Agreement Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects . 39
Table B.15 Correlation Between Industry Firm Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table B.16 Result Comparison for Total Firm Births . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table B.17 Result Comparison for Estimated Firm Enry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure A.1 Original Bandwidth Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure A.2 Extended Bandwidth Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure A.3 State Pair Differenced Tax Variable Cross Correlations . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure A.4 State Pair and One Lag Differenced Tax Variable Cross Correlations . 25
Figure A.5 Absolute Value Weighted Tax Differential Distribution . . . . . . . . . 26
vABSTRACT
This paper uses a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the impacts of taxes on firm
entry rates between neighboring states. We utilize matched county pairs as an approximate
bandwidth around the discontinuity in state policies imposed at their border. This estimation
strategy controls for unobserved location specific determinants of firm entry, as well as policy
responses to shocks shared across borders. We estimate this impact using a sample of 107
state-border pairs between 1999 and 2009. We add to the literature by using the large array
of top marginal tax rates, including property, income, sales, corporate, capital gains, workers
compensation, and unemployment insurance tax rates. This controls for joint changes in tax
rates that governments may implement to accomplish policy goals. Our results indicate that
property, sales, and income taxes have the largest negative effect on firm start up rates.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Taxes are a major lever that policy makers use to bring about change in communities, where
many attempt to either spur economic growth or raise revenue for new initiatives. Estimating
the impacts of taxes on economic activity provides large value to lawmakers looking to under-
stand and assess how and when to raise or lower taxes. For many states this impact is doubly
important as they are required to have balanced operating budgets at the end of each fiscal
year. Because of this, states cannot use deficit spending to make up for short run slow losses
in tax revenue, and are forced to navigate a careful balance between promoting employment
and wage growth while maintaining yearly revenue. Knowing how tax policies impact economic
activity provides policy makers more knowledge on the real costs of implementing tax policy
changes, particularly over short time periods.
One of the major ways in which taxes may impact economic activity is through deterring
new firm start ups. Firms provide new employment, capital, and innovation into economies,
while still bringing new tax revenue to state coffers. Many tax cuts are carried out under the
assumption that increased growth will quickly return government tax revenue back to their
original level, or, to those looking to raise taxes, that hikes will not have a large distortionary
effect on economic growth. Providing estimated values for the impacts of taxes and expenditures
on firm entry might better allow State and Federal government’s the ability to properly account
for tax incidence.
Accordingly this paper tests whether or not taxes impact firm entry rates. This topic has
been constantly examined by economists over the years. One of the major unanswered questions
is accounting for joint changes in tax policy when estimating these impacts. Traditionally
researchers have only estimated a few taxes at once, while the levers of policy actions extend
across a large array of tax rates. We add value to the literature by including the longest array
of top marginal tax rates used to date. This includes property, income, corporate, capital gains,
2sales, workers compensation, and unemployment insurance top marginal tax rates.
These tax rates cover the vast majority of existing tax rates that state policy makers use.
Many governments may opt to change tax rates jointly. An example of a policy that would
cause such a joint movement may be lowering corporate taxes but keep revenue neutral by
raising income taxes. This allows us to both track changes in tax policy that alters state
expenditures as well as policy changes that are meant to change tax incidence. Much of the
existing literature includes a much smaller array of tax rates, which has the potential to create
omitted variable bias especially if governments attempt to hide the true burden of taxes by
shifting the tax incidence. Our longer array helps capture the full impact of these changes on
economic activity.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, we provide a model to show how
utilizing discontinuities along state borders allow researchers to control for location specific
determinants of firm entry when the full location choice of firms may be unknown. Next, we
explore characteristics of state tax structure, relative firm entry, and frequency of joint tax
changes. Then we explain our empirical design, which uses matched county pairs on either side
of state borders to identify the effects on taxes on firm start up rates.
We provide estimates for how differences in state level tax and expenditures per capita im-
pact relative firm entry rates into counties on either side of the border. This includes estimates
for a sliding scale of estimates for matched urban and rural communities, and year specific
effects. We conclude by providing an estimate for how large the aggregate impact of taxes is
on relative firm entry along US states based both on ranking by existing discrepancy in mean
firm entry rates, and by the predicted difference.
The results of this paper aim to provide clear, well identified, estimates of the impacts of
top marginal tax rates on firm entry. This estimate may be of value to policy makers looking
to judge the efficacy of tax cuts or hikes on local economic activity and state tax revenue better
than existing estimates.
3CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Location choice of firms and individuals has a rich history in economics. At its core, the
question is what drives households and firms to choose to locate in particular communities.
Tiebout (1956) argued that individuals sorted into locations based on their preferences for
prices and public amenities. He posited that, because households can vote with their feet,
counties have incentives to adjust their provision of services in order to attract residents.1
Guided by Tiebouts model, the early firm entry literature focused on sorting over all avail-
able possible markets. McFadden (1974) provided a general framework for using the conditional
Logit function to estimate firm entry choices over all available possible markets. Early papers
such as Carlton (1979, 1983) and Schmenner (1975, 1982) failed to find incidence of taxes on
firm entry rates, instead finding that higher taxes could attract more firms. Starting in the
80’s methods and data allowed for cleaner identification, such that authors started to more
definitively show that taxes had a negative impact on business activity, including Wasylenko
& McGuire (1985), Bartick (1985), Papke (1991), and Hines (1996).
Researchers have continued to estimate models of firms sorting over a large number of
counties. Gabe and Bell (2004) used Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions show how
taxes and government spending on education impact firm location in Maine. Their results
show that increasing tax rates to raise education spending per pupil causes no distortion on
firm entry rates. Arauzo-Carod et al (2010) provide a review of these sorting-type studies.
They show that agglomeration and market size tend to have a significant positive effect on
firm entry rates, while wages and taxes act in the opposite direction. Further, findings for a
negative effect of property values as implied in the traditional Tiebout models is even weaker
(see Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994) for a comprehensive review of Tiebout model estimates).
1Sorting literature similarly gave birth to tax competition among states as over viewed by Wilson (1999). Our
paper can be seen as an extension of this literature, where states compete to have preferential tax differentials
compared to neighboring states
4Increasingly researchers have utilized border-difference techniques to establish local esti-
mates of the impacts of taxes on firm entry rates. This method controls for endogeneity of
government policy in response to local economic outcomes. For example, high economic activ-
ity states may raise their taxes knowing that local agglomeration factors will continue to attract
an asymmetrically high amount of new firm start ups, while low economic activity states may
lower taxes to attract new businesses.2 This response would upwards-bias the estimate of the
impacts of taxes. Using the differences in firm entry rates along state borders controls for local
agglomeration factors, and treats differences in policy variables as exogenous.
This technique relies on the assumption that new firms pick entry locations within a local
choice set. Recent studies on agglomeration economies seem to support this view. Rosenthal
and Strange (2003, 2005), and Arzaghi and Henderson (2008)) show that entrepreneurs weight
potential locations within a mile of their current location significantly higher than distances
further away. Use of border discontinuity designs started with Holmes (1998) analysis of right
to work laws on manufacturing employment growth. In Holmes’ paper, he used right to work
status as a proxy for an unobserved cost of being on either side of a state border imposed by
”pro” and ”anti” business policies. He then tested whether or not right to work status affected
manufacturing employment growth. His estimates found that counties that have right to work
status attract more manufacturing firms than states without right to work status.
Since Holmes’ study, this technique has been adopted by researchers looking to identify
effects of additional state policies, including minimum wages (Dube et al, 2008; Rohlin, 2011),
welfare (McKinnish, 2005; 2007), and school quality (Dhar and Ross, 2012). Recent papers
looking at the impacts of taxes on firm start up rates, including Rathelot and Sillard (2008),
Duranton et al (2011), and Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross (2014).
Rohlin (2011) looked at the impact of minimum wages on firm start up rates using aggre-
gated data. Utilizing the Dun and Bradstreet Marketplace data files, Rohlin constructed bands
2Further, tax and other policy parameters tend to feature prolonged periods of stability, and changes may
be endogenous to many common dependent variables, such that changes in GDP, wages, and employment will
entice government officials to try and improve economic performance. This has led to time series applications
to use narrative approaches to try and identify the impacts of exogenous shocks to tax rates on macroeconomic
variables. This is why narrative approaches are currently common in the macoreconometrics literature as a way
of estimating the impacts of taxes see Romer and Romer (2007), and Mertens and Ravn (2013).
5around state borders, and then derived estimates on the impact of minimum wage changes on
firm start up rates. He showed that increasing the minimum wage decreased new establishment
activity in industries that relied heavily on minimum wage workers, but that changes in the
minimum wage did not decrease employment in existing establishments.
Chirinko and Wilson (2008) use a border discontinuity technique to estimate the impact
of state investment tax credits on firm start up rates. Rathelot and Sillard (2008) use the
border discontinuity technique in a Probit model to show that increasing the total tax rate
differential increases the probability of a firm picking a side between 1-5%. Duranton, et al
(2011) difference firm entry rates in neighboring areas to estimate the impact of taxes on
employment. While their traditional OLS estimates (without the spatial difference) show a
positive relationship between taxes and firm entry rates, after applying the spatial difference,
taxes negatively impact firm start up rates.
A recent paper by Rohlin, Ross, and Rosenthal (2014) mirrors our paper very closely. They
estimate a linear probability model of firm entry using a border difference estimator. They
use GIS coded data to get a closer bandwidth to the border than our method, and show
that increasing the personal income tax differential actually increases the likelihood of firms
entering on one side of the border. However, they show that increasing the corporate and sales
tax differential can drastically reduce the relative firm entry probability.
They utilize a measure of state-level government expenditures per capita, and utilize Tax
Foundation data on top marginal sales, corporate, and personal income tax rates from 2000 to
2003. They estimate a linear probability model of the chance that a firm enters onto one side of
the border. They then use reciprocal agreements on where individuals pay income taxes based
on location of work rather than location of residence to try to control for proper allocation
of tax burdens on each side of the state, and to provide additional strength in identification.
Finally, they then use zip code level data to estimate average entry along each side of the
border. Both with and without the reciprocal agreements in place, they show that there is
a negative impact of increasing the tax differential between states on the probability of firm
entry.
6Our paper differs by having a considerably larger number of tax policy variables, thus better
controlling for other tax policies that may impact business activity. Moreover, we also include
a longer time series than Rohlin et al, providing additional variation in state level tax policies
over our window. We differ in only having county level data, rather than the finer zip code level
data that Rohlin et al use, and advantage of their study in that it provides a finer bandwidth
in which to identify impacts.
A major issue with the existing literature is the failure to settle on the best variables to
use for identifying the effects of taxes on firm start up rates. Carlton (1983) used top marginal
tax rates for corporate and income tax, but weighted them together, as well as property tax
rates. Schmenner (1987) uses state and local property tax revenues per dollar of personal
income. Helms (1985) used a budget constraint to estimate the impacts of rising tax revenue
on explanatory variables. All three versions have modern equivalents and the literature has
not settled on a single best practice to recover the proper marginal effects.
Theory indicates that marginal tax rates are what matter to individuals, and measures of
average tax burden change due to both fluctuations in wages or profits, as well as to changes in
tax rates. Using average tax rates may add endogeneity into models. Also, politicians may alter
multiple taxes at once in order to accomplish policy goals, such that excluding taxes may imply
omitted variable bias. Therefore, we argue that using top marginal tax rates is the preferred
method of estimating marginal effects of taxes.
From the literature, we see that on average taxes negatively impact firm start up rates,
especially as researchers have gone from studying sorting over all available entry choices, to
local choices along policy discontinuities. However, how taxes are calculated and used in studies
differs wildly among authors. Various studies have used measures of average tax revenue, added
together top marginal tax rates, or included a single available tax rate. As a result, a key
contribution of this study is the use of more recent spatial difference techniques combined with
a larger array of top marginal tax rates that may affect firm entry rates.
7CHAPTER 3. THEORY & METHODS
0.1 Theory
As entrepreneurs and firms look to start up a business in a new location they first choose a
market to enter. This choice is due to primary considerations such as labor market characteris-
tics, or location preferences of the owner. They then pick among possible locations within that
market. Our model looks at choice of firm entry across state borders, such that individuals have
mobility across the border. As a result, firms treat location specific determinants of profit as
the same on both sides of the border. This process leaves policy drivers as the only remaining
difference in expected profits. We formalize the conditions for this process below.
Assume there exists a spatial equilibrium where wages and capital costs adjust to equalize
profits across space, conditional on local tax and location specific variables affecting firm level
productivity. If markets are competitive, firms will earn zero economic profits in the long run,
but in the short run, demand or policy shocks can result in short run profits (or losses). We
expect that if a state raises its taxes relative to its neighbors, higher relative production costs
and lower relative profits will exist for counties in that state. Firms looking to locate in that
market will, all else equal, choose the lower cost side of the border. The higher relative taxes
rates will deter firms from entering. Over time, entry on the lower tax side of the border will
bid up prices until after-tax prices, and profits, equalize on either side of the state border.
Prices can be proxied by the tax rates directly. Firms make decisions based on information
from the previous year, as governments might concurrently change policy along with market
entry and there may exist costs to establishing a business.
Assumption 1. Assume that a firms’ profit can be expressed as a linear function, for a given
location, state, and time pair denoted (i, j, t),
pii,j,t = γi + βj + Zt−1γ +Xt−1β + i,j,t (1)
8E[ijt] = 0 (2)
Zt−1 is a 1×K1 row vector of location specific terms, and Xt−1 is a 1×K2 row vector of state
specific terms, and γ, and β are location and state specific coefficients.
Location specific variables include local agglomeration measures, labor market characteris-
tics such as educational attainment, and other local factors that may affect firm productivity.
State-level variables include taxes, regulatory policies, and government expenditures. Both
sets of variables may evolve over time. Therefore this assumption simply states that the policy
variables enter directly into the profit function, and that it is shared across all firm types.
Now let us focus on a market that is defined by the interval [−1, 1], such that for firms that
locate at y ∈ [−1, 0) are in state A, and firms at location yˆ ∈ [0, 1] are in state B. Now, let
(y, yˆ) denote a firm’s location choice, then the firm chooses y over yˆ if and only if
E[piy,A,t − piyˆ,B,t] > 0 (3)
Assumption 2. βj , γi and Zt−1 are continuous locally for at least some distance  > 0 around
all border points between two states.
This states that as location y and location yˆ get asymptotically close to the border, the
difference between unobserved location specific fixed effects and observed location specific vari-
ables converge to zero. This is a technical illustration of labor and capital mobility in close
geographic areas. As the distance between the two locations increases this may no longer be
the case, as illustrated in Holmes (1998).
Therefore, conditional on firms choosing locations (y, yˆ) arbitrarily close to the border, the
profit function becomes,
E[piy,A,t − piyˆ,B,t] = βA − βB + (XA,t−1 −XB,t−1)β2 (4)
As we move away from the border location characteristics might dominate the policy effect,
especially when we expect policy effects to be small. Comparably, our theory favors the use
of regression discontinuity techniques for estimating policy treatment effects, especially when
location specific drivers of firm entry might be unknown or unobserved.
90.2 Variables and Data
0.2.1 Matching Process
Our theory holds that as the location choice of firm entrants approaches a state border the
difference in location-specific attributes on either side of the border approaches zero. Thus, an
advantage of the border design is that these location-specific factors are differenced away in a
specification that considers the difference in expected profits on either side of the border. We
estimate a closeness to the border bandwidth at the county level. The average county in our
data set is 1,260 square miles, or about 35 miles per side if it is approximately square. This
distance is slightly longer than more refined approaches such as Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross
(2014).
Our matching procedure is as follows. We first obtained the Census’ County Adjacency
File3 to construct county-pairs by generating all pairs of counties that have adjacent counties
in a neighboring state. This process is outlined in Table A.1. We use the file to match each
county with every adjacent county in a different state. The assignment of subject and neighbor
status is derived from their ordering in the County Adjacency File. From this matching we
track state FIPS codes to create a list of matched state pairs. This matching generates 1,213
matched county-pairs with 107 state-pairs in each year. Throughout we will index each state-
pair by g = 1, ..., 107, and the set of matched county pairs for each state-pair by i = 1, ..., Ng,
where Ng is the number of pairs for each border.
0.2.2 Firm Entry Data
Our primary variable of interest is county-level firm start up rates for all firms in a year.
These data were procured from the Census Bureaus Business Dynamic Statistics program.4
The data include the number of firm births, deaths, expansions, and contractions for each year
from 1999 to 2009. Data are reported in total number of firm births, and for broad NAICS
coded industries. Our main variable of interest, births ratio, is calculated for each matched
county-pair for each state pairs (A,B) in time t as,
3https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/county-adjacency.html
4http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/overview.html
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births ratioi,g,t = ln(nsub,A,t)− ln(nnbr,B,t) (5)
where nsub,A,t is the number of new firm entrants in state A’s current subject county at
time t and nnbr,B,t is the corresponding number of firm births in state B’s neighboring county.
0.2.3 Tax Data
We include the top state marginal tax rates of seven taxes from 1998 to 2008 in our analysis.
Of note, Agrawal (2015) argues that there is endogeneity between local taxes and state level tax
rates and border tax differentials. In his model, low tax states set higher taxes on the border
than interior towns, and high tax states will set lower taxes on the border than the interior.
The logic here is to mitigate, or not exacerbate, the border differential as much as possible from
both sides of the border, but this reduction occurs only gradually as you approach the border.
Since most state laws do not enable towns to raise taxes sufficiently high to completely
offset the discontinuity with local option taxes, this should downwards bias our estimates, as
the actual discontinuity is less than the observed rate in our state-level figures. Argawal (2016)
shows this relationship empirically for location optional sales taxes.
We use a one period lagged difference in the top marginal values due to time costs to
opening, procuring permits, zoning, and building infrastructure. For each tax rate τ and state
pair g = (A,B), at time t the tax ratio was calculated as
τ ratiog,t = τA,t − τB,t (6)
State marginal income tax and long term capital gains tax rates were obtained from The
National Bureau of Economic Research. For income tax rates we use the highest marginal tax
rates available, as this is the rate most applied to small business and S corporations. When
not available, we calculate the highest implied tax rate.5
Corporate and sales tax rates were compiled from The Council of State Governments Book
of States.6 We use the highest marginal state tax rates on business corporations. Where rates
5http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-marginal/
6http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states
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differ between banks and non-banks, we use the non-bank rate, and we restrict sales tax rates
to those levied on general merchandise, rather than food, clothing, or medicine.
Property taxes are calculated from household level data provided by the Minnesota Popu-
lation Centers Integrated Public Use Micro-data Series (IPUMS).7 Workers compensation are
calculated from Thomason et al (2001) between 1977 and 1995, with data afterwards provided
by the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services.
Finally, the top marginal unemployment insurance tax rates are provided by the US De-
partment of Labor. To calculate these rates, they multiply the top marginal tax rate, τmaxg,t ,
by the maximum wage level to which the rate is applied, Wmaxit . They normalize this figure by
the average wage in a state in a current year, W¯it. Then the unemployment insurance tax is
calculated for each state as:
τA,t =
τmaxA,t W
max
A,t
W¯A,t
(7)
0.2.4 Additional Data
We compiled log state governments expenditures on highways, education, and welfare per
capita using annual historical Census data on State Government Finances.8 We use expen-
ditures on Education for our education value, the sums of expenditures on Public Welfare,
Hospitals, and Health, for the welfare measure, and Highways expenditures for highway spend-
ing. We divide each figure by Census state population estimates and then take logs.9 The
difference between state A and state B, for each of our expenditure figures is calculated:
exp percap g, t = log(expA,t/popA,t)− log(expB,t/popB,t) (8)
We include state level variables for percent of workforce unionized, log real fuel prices,
population density, percent of employment in manufacturing, and percent of population with
high school education. This data is compiled from a mix of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
the Current Population Survey, the EIA, and the Census.
7https://usa.ipums.org/usa/
8https://www.census.gov/govs/state/
9http://www.census.gov/popest/
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Finally, county level geographic amenity data were acquired from the USDA.10 These mea-
sures are the only county level data we include in our empirical estimates. We use the nor-
malized values of hours of sunlight in January, temperature in July, humidity in July, topology
score, and percent of county that is water. After normalization each amenity variable is nor-
mally distributed with approximate mean zero and standard deviation 1. These terms should
be interpreted as deviations from the mean. Again, we difference these county level Z-scores.
0.2.5 Preliminary Analysis
Summary statistics are provided in Table (B.1). Of note is the fact that for all the taxes,
the standard deviations are quite large relative to their means. Thus, there should be plenty
of variation to provide identification of the impacts of taxes on firm entry rates.
We further plot simple cross correlations between our differenced tax variables in Figure
A as a heuristic test that states use taxes jointly to accomplish policy goals. Between 1998
and 2008, income tax and capital gains tax rates exhibit strong positive correlation; the simple
correlation between values is 0.64. Sales, payroll, workers compensation, and unemployment
insurance tax rates are only weakly correlated with other tax rates. The presence of simple
correlations indicate that studies that do not include a larger array of taxes, may suffer from
omitted variable bias. Thus modeling firm entry using a larger set of top marginal tax rates
will improve estimates of tax incidence on firm start up rates.
We also plot cross correlations between the differenced tax variables for each state in table
A. Due to the differenced nature of the data we are looking for co-movement between tax
variables, which we see in a non-zero number of cases between all of our different tax variables.
Of note is that the workers compensation tax seems to have more variation in the difference
then some of our more traditional tax rates.
0.3 Empirical Design
As outlined in the previous section, the main parameters of interest are the impacts of top
marginal tax rates on firm startup rates. We employ a pseudo-regression discontinuity approach
10USDA Natural Amenities Rankings
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as a way of controlling for local determinants of firm entry, as well as shared responses to larger
macroeconomic shocks.
0.3.1 Regression Discontinuity Approach
Our empirical estimation is based on equation 4. We take two states that share a border
denoted A and B, and denote each adjacent county in neighboring states by either a subject
(sub) or neighbor (nbr) classification. Then, taking the difference between the matched county
pairs we get the equation,
ln(nsub,A,t)− ln(nnbr,B,t) = γ + (XA,t−1 −XB,t−1)β2 + sub,A,t − nbr,B,t (9)
Here, from Equation (4), we have γ = βA − βB. Since we assume that long run profits are
zero there cannot be any systemic long run differences in expected profit, therefore γ = 0 and
most likely βA, βB = 0. We later relax our zero profit condition, and test a state-pair fixed
effect model where γ = γA,B = βA − βB is allowed to vary in order to pick up unobserved
heterogeneity that is unaccounted for in our baseline model. We also believe that there are
frictions to startup costs, and utilize a one year lagged set of independent variables.11
For each i, g, t-triplet there may be unobserved shocks to the state-pair border that affect
all counties along the border. For example, if the Mississippi river floods, counties that are
divided by the river will be affected, while counties on borders away from the river will not
be. To address this concern, we use clustered standard errors on the state pair grouping. This
method will not affect the estimated coefficients, but will adjust the standard errors of the
estimates. It can be shown that our estimate has the same point identification of estimators
that take the difference in border averages, but has a different variance-covariance matrix.
A possible concern with our specification is that states may change taxes in response to the
difference in firm entry rates. This would introduce endogeneity in the model. However, due
to the stability of our policy parameters, it seems unlikely that governments are responding
11We both used contemporaneous dependent variables, and tried larger lags, but our variables are heavily
inter-temporally correlated, so there was no major difference occurs in sign or significance, such that only fit
deteriorates as we extended the lag structure.
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to firm startup rates. Furthermore, it is unlikely that states set statewide policy based on the
subset of border counties that we include in our model.
Finally, we estimate a variety of different permutations of our baseline model. We split our
controls into two sets: county level geographic amenities and state level economic controls. We
estimate models that have no additional controls besides for tax and expenditure variables,
models that have only state or geographic amenities, and then a model that includes both sets.
The purpose is check whether the estimated coefficients on the tax and expenditure variables
become statistically insignificant once we account for these additions.
0.3.2 Sensitivity Tests
0.3.2.1 Extended Bandwidth
We subject our estimates to several sensitivity test. First we extend the bandwidth of
our estimator. For this process we match each subject county to each of its neighbors neigh-
bors, while excluding any county in the original neighbor set. The process of generating these
matched pairs is analogous to our initial match, where we now match the original neighbors,
and each of their neighbors in the same state, then remove every county from our original
match.12 We provide a graphical representation of these matching processes in Figure 8. This
extended match connects 1,549 county-pairs across 107 state pairs each year.
We matched every subject county with every neighbor’s neighbor that the subject county
was not previously matched with. This estimate extends the distance between each of our
observations so we expect state tax differentials to play a less important role. Our new match
becomes the model,
ln(nsub,A,t)− ln(nnbr nbr,B,t) = γ + (XA,t−1 −XB,t−1)β2 + sub,A,t − nbr nbr,B,t (10)
0.3.2.2 Relaxing Coefficient Symmetry
We test a version of this model where we do not impose symmetry in the coefficients across
borders. Instead we let coefficients take on their own value in the difference, and use a set of
12A full table with the steps is provided in Table A.2
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F-tests to test whether our assumption that βk,A = −βk,B, ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K2} holds.
ln(nsub,A,t)− ln(nnbr,B,t) = γ +XA,t−1β2,sub +XB,t−1β2,nbr + sub,A,t − nbr,B,t (11)
0.3.2.3 Period Specific Cross Section Analysis
Third, we estimate cross-sectional models for each year in our sample. We then compare
these estimates to our pooled OLS estimates to gauge if tax incidence on firm startup rates
remains stable over time.
ln(nsub,A,t)− ln(nnbr,B,t) = γt + (XA,t−1 −XB,t−1)β2,t + sub,A,t − nbr,B,t : t = 1999, ..., 2008
(12)
0.3.2.4 Industry Sub codes
We estimate the model for industry sub-sets of the data (by 2 digit NAICS code) to
investigate if the estimated effects of tax rates are stable across industries. We have sufficient
data on firm entry for the following industries: Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry, and Hunting;
Retail Trade; Manufacturing; and Finance and Insurance.
0.3.3 Sub-sample Estimates
Lastly, we estimate our model for four different urbanization categories. First, is for counties
that are in Metropolitan Statistical Areas in general, and where both subject and neighbor
counties are in the same MSA. We then partition counties into areas where both are either
urban or rural. We use the ERS classification system to determine if a county is urban or rural,
where a county is defined as urban if its classification is 5 or below, and rural if its classification
is 6 or higher.13
We further follow Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross (2015) by including comparisons between
states that have reciprocal agreements, and those without reciprocal agreements. Our original
samples might be biased, as a few states have reciprocal agreements, where individuals pay the
13http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-codes/documentation.aspx
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income tax rate of the state they work in rather than where they live. We split our sample into
states with and without reciprocal agreements, and estimate our model on each sample.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Our main results are reported in Table (B.2). The first four columns report the pooled
OLS estimates with and without our sets of additional control variables. The last two columns
report our fixed effect estimates. Higher relative income taxes and sales taxes deter firm entry.
This result is robust to the addition of controls, and in fact, the estimated effects become
slightly stronger (more negative) with the added measures.
While statistically significant the effects are economically small. A 1 percent increase in
income tax differentials corresponds to a 0.8 percent decrease in the relative firm start up
rates, and similarly, a 1 percent increase in sales tax differentials corresponds to a 0.1 percent
decrease in the relative firm start up rates. Higher relative property tax rates also exert a
negative influence on firm births, although this effect becomes statistically insignificant when
amenity measures are included in the model. While capital gains, corporate tax, workers
compensation, and unemployment insurance tax rates are individually insignificant, the set of
seven tax rates are jointly significant.
Of the three expenditure measures included in the model, only the difference in log welfare
spending per capita is statistically significant. The coefficient is economically very small, such
that a 1% increase in the difference corresponds to 0.001% higher firm entry rates.
When we run models with state-pair level fixed effects we fail to obtain any statistically
significant results. However, the value of these models are dubious. We argue that our pooled
OLS estimates are most likely the properly specified model as firm start up rates are an already
differenced estimate. Thus the inclusion of state pair fixed effect requires year to year divergence
in expected profit from entry, which shouldnt occur under perfect competition.
Table B.4 reports the estimates for the extended bandwidth version of our model. We
expect that the increased distance between the two locations, and the increased distance from
the border, will diminish the impact taxes have on firm start up rates. Meanwhile we would
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expect the measures of state and local factors to have a larger impact. Our results are consistent
with these expectations. The income and sales tax rates lose statistical significance across
model types. Further, our state level controls remain largely insignificant, as do our geographic
controls. Thus, the fit of the model at large seems to decrease as the distance between counties
increases.
When we relax the assumption that that coefficients are equal on either side of the border,
we find that for most of our variables, the effects remain equal but opposite across the border.
Table B.6 reports coefficients, while Table B.14 provides F-tests of the hypothesis that the
coefficients are equal for each variable, βi,sub = −βi,nbr. The results verify our belief that
the coefficients are of equal magnitude and opposite sign. The exceptions are sales tax rates
and workers compensation tax rates. For the subject county sales taxes are strongly and
negatively significant, but for the neighbor they are insignificant. We see an equivalent note in
the workers compensation figures in our F tests, where for the neighboring county it appears
to be significant, but not for the subject county.14 However, given the rest of taxes pass this
test, this finding might be a spurious result due to the number of regressors.
Table B.11 shows regression results for each year between 1999 and 2009. We include state
controls but exclude geographic amenities. Property taxes remain consistently negative and
statistically significant over the time period. Likewise, sales tax rates remain negative and
statistically significant, with the effect becoming somewhat larger over time. Income taxes
are insignificant, but negative, at the beginning of the time period, but become statistically
significant and larger in the later years. Log highway and welfare expenditures per capita
are positive drivers of firm entry, but the effects are inconsistently significant across the time
periods and the magnitudes are very small.
Finally, Table B.12 reports the estimates by NAICS sub codes, Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry,
and Hunting; Retail Trade; Manufacturing; and Finance and Insurance. These results are very
consistent with the results for all firms in Table B.2. We expected higher property taxes to
have a larger detrimental effect on agriculture services, and capital gains taxes to have a higher
14Also, the assignment process here might be driving results. We are not running each coefficient as a fixed
effect for each border, but rather across all counties defined as ”neighbor” in our sample. However, by using
clustered standard errors we do not have the degrees of freedom to run this test for each state-pair.
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impact on financial firm entry. However, this does not seem to be the case. Property, income
and sales taxes are significantly negative in all specifications, and furthermore, the magnitudes
are very similar across the industries. It may be that our geographic scale, the county is too
large to detect differences, as many different types of firms are likely to enter a given county
over the time period of our study.
Table B.8 provides an alternative look at this effect. We see that as we widen and narrow
our definition of urban, the effect of higher relative capital gains taxes remains positive and
significant, while income and sales taxes remain negative and significant. In contrast, in rural
areas, property taxes are the only tax rate with negative and significant effects. They seem to
solely drive the firm entry differential, to the point where the joint F-tests are rejected across
all model specifications. This property tax differential is consistent with regional development
theory that predicts that as manufacturing firms mature, they move to rural areas to take
advantage of lower property values (rents) and lower employee wages.
As a final output of our paper, we compare two different rankings to identify which bor-
ders are most (or least) disadvantaged with regard to tax differentials. First we calculate the
weighted tax differential by multiplying the tax coefficients from Table B.2, column 4 by each
state’s marginal tax values. This estimates an expected value of the ratio of firm start up rates
driven by the tax differentials. These are plotted in Figure A. For most states, the weighted
tax differential is very small, thus the implied impact of taxes on relative firm start up rates
is ultimately small. However, for a few counties, this is not the case, and we see clear outliers
where more than a 1% difference in firm start up rates is motivated by the difference in tax
rates.
To illustrate how important this effect is for firm entry we rank the county-pairs by the
absolute difference in the mean number of firm startups, and compare this to the weighted tax
differential. Table B.16 reports the top 10 largest mean differences in firm start-ups. Since we
calculate these terms in absolute value, we report which side of the border has the advantage
for firm startups in column 2 and which has the advantage in terms for tax rate differences in
column 4. Sixty-two percent of the time, the side with the more advantageous weighted tax
differential also has the higher mean firm start up differential. We similarly rank the top 10
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states by Weighted Tax Differential in B.17. Compared to weighting by mean firm start up
rate, there is a higher correlation between having a higher weighted tax differential and mean
firm startups.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
This paper estimates the average impact of taxes on firm start up rates. Using a model
that relies on the similarity of locations on either side of a state border, we are able to effec-
tively control for location-specific determinants of firm entry in our empirical design, and more
precisely isolate the effects of policy that do vary on opposite sides of a state border.
We find that counties with higher property, income, and sales taxes relative to a neighboring
county in another state, have lower firm start-up rates. On average, a 1% increase in the
property tax differential decreases firm start up rates by 0.3%, while a 1% increase in income
and sales tax differentials decreases firm start up rates by 0.01%. These results are generally
consistent across industry groups, and time periods in our sample. They are also largely robust
to the addition of added controls.
Our estimated models inability to find significant corporate and capital gains taxes follows
from characteristics of new firm entrants. Lacking firm-level characteristics, our model approx-
imates an average firm from the joint distribution of firm characteristics. However, most new
firms are small S corporations, meaning that owners pay top marginal income taxes rather than
corporate taxes, and firm employment and output is relatively low. Sales, income, and property
taxes may play a significantly larger role in their profits than capital gains and corporate tax
rates. Moreover, most new firms have a relatively short life span, such that investments in the
company will probably not be recouped, and capital gains tax rates are not likely to impact
the majority of small new firm entrants.
Government expenditure variables do not seem to impact firm start up rates. This might be
due to the fact that individuals can live in one county that has a preferred public expenditure
bundle and set up a business in a neighboring county that has a preferred regulatory policy.
Our robustness tests using Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross (2014) reciprocal agreements mirror
our main model and estimates, indicating that this impact is not large.
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Based on our estimates, we calculate a weighted tax differential, showing that the impact of
taxes on firm entry rates remain small, only accounting for about 0.2% of the difference in firm
start up behavior across borders. Despite this, the side with the preferred taxation policy had
more firm startups 62% of the time in our sample. Therefore while taxes might have a small
impact at the margin, their adjustment may still be beneficial to communities and states.
Future work on this issue could benefit from more dis-aggregated, firm-level data with firm
specific characteristics. This would help establish better estimates of tax incidence on firm
startup and life cycle behavior. Our current estimates are limited by our set of covariates.
Lacking firm specific data, our estimates rely on a proxy ”average firm”, which is most likely
small and not paying corporate taxes, nor have venture capital backing. Thus taxes that may
have impacts based on firm characteristics may be omitted from our model.
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APPENDIX A. DATA & TABLES
Table A.1 Generating Subject Neighbor Pairs
Step Description
1 Download the County Adjacency Table (CAT) from the census here
2 Load the CSV into a statistical software of choice
3 Assign joint state and county FIPS values to NA’s in the loaded data set
4 Sort through the first column of the CAT for every adjacent county in another state
5 The first column is the ”subject” counties, and the adjacents are the ”neighbors”
Table A.2 Generating Subject Neighbor Pairs
Step Description
1 Load the CAT into a statistical software of choice
2 Assign joint state and county FIPS values to NA’s in the loaded data set
3 Load the original subject neighbor pairs (OSN) into statistical software of choice
4 For every neighbor in OSN, find every adjacent county in its own state
5 Exclude from this match any county that was in OSN alreads
6 match the subject from OSN to each of these new neighbors
7 The first column is the ”subject” and the second as the ”neighbor’s neighbor”
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Figure A.1 Original Bandwidth Borders
Red borders are subject counties, blue borders are neighbor counties.
Figure A.2 Extended Bandwidth Borders
Red borders are subject counties, blue borders are neighbor counties.
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Figure A.3 State Pair Differenced Tax Variable Cross Correlations
Figure A.4 State Pair and One Lag Differenced Tax Variable Cross Correlations
26
Figure A.5 Absolute Value Weighted Tax Differential Distribution
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APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL RESULTS
Table B.1 Summary Table for Total Firm Births
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Births Ratio 13,115 −0.059 1.550 −5.670 5.328
Property Tax Difference 13,115 −0.099 0.503 −1.672 1.241
Income Tax Difference 13,115 1.220 3.988 −9.280 9.860
Capital Gains Tax Difference 13,115 1.911 4.321 −9.280 13.420
Sales Tax Difference 13,115 −0.316 2.137 −7.000 7.250
Corp Tax Difference 13,115 1.282 3.678 −8.900 12.000
Workers Comp Tax Difference 13,115 0.030 0.666 −2.762 2.451
Unemp. Tax Difference 13,115 0.034 1.344 −4.564 16.070
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff 13,115 9.589 210.233 −807 692
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff 13,115 −39.025 144.832 −756 358
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 13,115 −38.699 267.490 −1,072 953
Pct Highschool 13,115 0.273 3.762 −10.100 12.000
Real Fuel Price 13,115 0.306 2.351 −7.500 8.200
Pct Union 13,115 0.636 4.672 −14.900 16.100
Pop Density 13,115 41.985 162.362 −746.200 901.000
Pct Manuf 13,115 0.011 0.067 −0.240 0.250
Jan Temp Z Diff 13,115 0.002 0.206 −1.291 1.291
Jan Sun Z Diff 13,115 0.042 0.582 −2.499 3.583
Jul Temp Z Diff 13,115 0.065 0.601 −4.475 4.115
Jul Hum Z Diff 13,115 −0.029 0.424 −3.697 3.081
Topog Z Diff 13,115 −0.023 0.645 −2.578 2.123
Ln Water Z Diff 13,115 −0.054 0.872 −3.456 3.155
All variables are for the difference between our subject and neighbor counties.
At the state level, this is 1177 observations. Further, all tax variables are
scaled to be between 0 and 100 rather than 0 and 1. For each variable we observe
them 13,115 times when not accounting for positive or negative infinify values
in firm start up rates.
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Table B.2 Regression Discontinuity Models for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Property Tax Difference −0.206 −0.371∗∗ −0.136 −0.297∗∗ 0.025 0.027
(0.151) (0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.119) (0.122)
Income Tax Difference −0.093∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.009
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.035)
Capital Gains Tax Difference 0.016 0.008 0.028 0.020 −0.001 −0.002
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
Sales Tax Difference −0.112∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.040) (0.041)
Corp Tax Difference 0.023 0.018 0.015 0.011 −0.013 −0.012
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
Workers Comp Tax Difference 0.001 0.090 −0.007 0.051 0.040 0.044
(0.111) (0.108) (0.096) (0.105) (0.069) (0.070)
Unemp. Tax Difference 0.008 0.012 −0.002 −0.006 −0.002 −0.002
(0.040) (0.036) (0.042) (0.038) (0.017) (0.017)
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0004∗ −0.00005 −0.00005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant −0.045 −0.055 −0.037 −0.046
(0.084) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087)
controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
amenities Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 13,115 13,115 13,115 13,115 13,115 13,115
R2 0.094 0.056 0.080 0.037 0.247 0.209
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The first four columns are estimated with OLS and clustered standard errors at the
state-pair level. Columns 5 and 6 are estimated with a fixed effect estimator
at the state-pair level with homoskedastic standard errors.
29
Table B.3 F-Tests for Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Total Firm Start Ups
Test F-Stat P(>F)
No Amenities, No Controls Taxes 3.6233 0.057
No Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 0.9885 0.3201
No Amenities, Controls Taxes 2.3806 0.1229
No Amenities, Controls Expenditures 1.0261 0.3111
Amenities, No Controls Taxes 5.2159 0.0224
Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 2.6372 0.1044
Amenities, Controls Taxes 3.6129 0.0574
Amenities, Controls Expenditures 2.7089 0.0998
FE No Amenities, Controls Taxes 0.0855 0.77
FE No Amenities, Controls Expenditures 0.2258 0.6346
FE Amenities, Controls Taxes 0.0666 0.7964
FE Amenities, Controls Expenditures 0.2144 0.6433
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Table B.4 Extended Bandwidth Discontinuity Models for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Property Tax Difference 0.039 −0.019 0.104 0.074 0.007 0.006
(0.147) (0.152) (0.143) (0.148) (0.112) (0.114)
Income Tax Difference −0.054 −0.063∗ −0.043 −0.050 0.008 0.012
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034)
Capital Gains Tax Difference 0.039 0.048∗ 0.043 0.053∗ −0.013 −0.013
(0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.012) (0.012)
Sales Tax Difference −0.040 −0.042 −0.051 −0.041 0.018 0.020
(0.049) (0.054) (0.052) (0.055) (0.037) (0.038)
Corp Tax Difference 0.006 −0.001 0.004 0.002 −0.024 −0.024
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Workers Comp Tax Difference 0.180 0.300∗∗ 0.139 0.216 −0.008 −0.007
(0.126) (0.152) (0.142) (0.178) (0.066) (0.068)
Unemp. Tax Difference −0.113∗ −0.110∗ −0.111 −0.109 0.011 0.011
(0.062) (0.064) (0.068) (0.071) (0.018) (0.019)
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0003 0.0001 0.00005
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 0.001 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ −0.00003 −0.00004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant −0.033 −0.017 −0.026 0.002
(0.100) (0.111) (0.105) (0.113)
controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
amenities Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 16,245 16,245 16,245 16,245 16,245 16,245
R2 0.097 0.038 0.081 0.023 0.298 0.267
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The first four columns are estimated with OLS and clustered standard errors at the
state-pair level. Columns 5 and 6 are estimated with a fixed effect estimator
at the state-pair level with homoskedastic standard errors.
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Table B.5 F-Tests for Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Extended Bandwith Total Firm
Start Ups
Test F-Stat P(>F)
No Amenities, No Controls Taxes 0.4263 0.5138
No Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 1.0015 0.317
No Amenities, Controls Taxes 0.1983 0.6561
No Amenities, Controls Expenditures 1.0061 0.3159
Amenities, No Controls Taxes 0.3042 0.5813
Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 3.0012 0.0832
Amenities, Controls Taxes 0.0935 0.7598
Amenities, Controls Expenditures 2.6759 0.1019
FE No Amenities, Controls Taxes 9e-04 0.9755
FE No Amenities, Controls Expenditures 0.1695 0.6805
FE Amenities, Controls Taxes 0 0.9983
FE Amenities, Controls Expenditures 0.1557 0.6931
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Table B.6 Not Symmetric Effects for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Property Tax Sub −0.048 −0.363∗∗
(0.185) (0.172)
Property Tax Nbr 0.209 0.352∗∗
(0.162) (0.148)
Income Tax Sub −0.149∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.044)
Income Tax Nbr 0.076∗ 0.057∗
(0.039) (0.032)
Capital Gains Tax Sub 0.037 0.025
(0.034) (0.031)
Capital Gains Tax nbr −0.069∗∗ −0.047
(0.034) (0.031)
Sales Tax Sub −0.149∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.041)
Sales Tax Nbr 0.036 0.005
(0.045) (0.045)
Corp Tax Sub 0.026 0.029
(0.028) (0.027)
Corp Tax Nbr 0.011 0.001
(0.023) (0.024)
Workers Comp Tax Sub −0.142 −0.113
(0.131) (0.120)
Workers Comp Tax Nbr −0.122 −0.226
(0.149) (0.150)
Unemp. Tax Sub −0.018 −0.059
(0.043) (0.044)
Unemp. Tax Nbr −0.014 −0.023
(0.076) (0.057)
Educ Spending Per Cap Sub −0.0001 −0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Educ Spending Per Cap Nbr 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Highway Spending Per Cap Sub 0.0004 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Highway Spending Per Cap Nbr −0.001 −0.0004
(0.001) (0.001)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Sub 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Sub −0.0005 −0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 1.085 1.667∗∗
(0.863) (0.764)
amenities Yes No
Observations 13,115 13,115
R2 0.098 0.053
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Each model is estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
with clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
coefficient values and standard errors are reported.
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Table B.7 F-Tests for Symmetry of Coefficients for Total Firm Start Ups
Test F-Stat P(>F)
ptax sub = -ptax nbr 0.0064 0.9361
inctax sub = -inctax nbr 1.7426 0.1868
capgntax sub = -capgntax nbr 0.3873 0.5337
salestax sub = -salestax nbr 4.5658 0.0326
corptax sub = -corptax nbr 0.6824 0.4088
wctaxfixed sub = -wctaxfixed nbr 3.2369 0.072
uitaxrate sub = -uitaxrate nbr 1.8872 0.1695
Table B.8 MSA Estates for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
In a MSA Same MSA Jointly Urban Jointly Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property Tax Difference −0.339 −0.153 −0.205 −0.390∗∗
(0.418) (0.614) (0.215) (0.174)
Income Tax Difference −0.183∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.068) (0.097) (0.042) (0.039)
Capital Gains Tax Difference 0.117∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.074∗ −0.019
(0.063) (0.077) (0.039) (0.026)
Sales Tax Difference −0.132 −0.253∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.069
(0.086) (0.086) (0.048) (0.053)
Corp Tax Difference 0.020 0.031 −0.037 0.058∗∗
(0.048) (0.073) (0.028) (0.026)
Workers Comp Tax Difference 0.425∗∗ 0.438 0.149 −0.109
(0.182) (0.293) (0.131) (0.163)
Unemp. Tax Difference 0.098∗ 0.084 0.031 −0.070
(0.060) (0.062) (0.048) (0.054)
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff −0.001 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff −0.002∗ −0.001 −0.00002 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Constant −0.248 −0.507∗ −0.329∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.261) (0.113) (0.101)
Observations 2,223 1,383 8,180 4,935
R2 0.117 0.168 0.050 0.089
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
and clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
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Table B.9 F-Tests for Density Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects for Total Firm Start Ups
Test F-Stat P(>F)
In MSA Taxes 0.3468 0.556
In MSA Exp 0.6577 0.4174
Same MSA Taxes 0.0086 0.9261
Same MSA Exp 1.0351 0.3091
Jointly Urban Taxes 0.9263 0.3359
Jointly Urban Exp 0.01 0.9203
Jointly Rural Taxes 5.9731 0.0146
Jointly Rural Exp 4.1527 0.4221
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Table B.10 Psuedo-RD for Stability over Time for Total Firm Births Pt I
Dependent variable:
births ratio
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prop Tax Diff −0.411∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗ −0.320∗∗ −0.479∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.158) (0.153) (0.158) (0.148) (0.102)
Inc Tax Diff −0.025 −0.026 −0.066∗∗ −0.061 −0.047 −0.055
(0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034)
Cap Tax Diff −0.045∗ −0.040∗ −0.025 −0.006 −0.018 −0.032
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.045) (0.036) (0.034)
Sal Tax Diff −0.083∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.027)
Corp Tax Diff −0.015 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.035∗ 0.030∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Work Comp Diff 0.309∗∗ 0.225 0.201 0.018 0.029 0.071
(0.123) (0.138) (0.145) (0.155) (0.122) (0.079)
Unemp. Tax Diff −0.045 0.0001 0.015 0.027 −0.022 0.062
(0.061) (0.077) (0.056) (0.069) (0.063) (0.052)
Ln Educ Diff −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Ln Hwy Diff 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Ln Welf. Diff 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant −0.034 −0.026 −0.013 −0.057 0.007 −0.042
(0.092) (0.082) (0.086) (0.110) (0.102) (0.060)
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
amenities No No No No No No
Observations 1,193 1,188 1,191 1,195 1,189 1,188
R2 0.068 0.059 0.066 0.050 0.052 0.068
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
and clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
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Table B.11 Psuedo-RD for Stability over Time for Total Firm Births Pt II
Dependent variable:
births ratio
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prop Tax Diff −0.344∗∗ −0.364∗∗ −0.396∗∗ −0.311 −0.351∗∗
(0.153) (0.152) (0.156) (0.190) (0.166)
Inc Tax Diff −0.063∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.031)
Cap Tax Diff −0.029 0.054∗∗ 0.036 0.032 0.028
(0.036) (0.024) (0.027) (0.033) (0.029)
Sal Tax Diff −0.136∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036)
Corp Tax Diff 0.037∗ 0.019 0.004 0.014 −0.007
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Work Comp Diff 0.066 0.142 0.102 0.086 0.089
(0.117) (0.113) (0.116) (0.124) (0.108)
Unemp. Tax Diff 0.003 −0.014 −0.034 0.020 0.070
(0.057) (0.047) (0.048) (0.055) (0.046)
Ln Educ Diff −0.0003 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Ln Hwy Diff 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0004
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Ln Welf. Diff 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Constant −0.015 −0.097 −0.072 −0.086 −0.075
(0.100) (0.089) (0.094) (0.103) (0.089)
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
amenities No No No No No
Observations 1,191 1,194 1,199 1,196 1,191
R2 0.064 0.062 0.069 0.067 0.077
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
and clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
37
Table B.12 Results for Firm Entry across NAICS Subcodes for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
Farming Farming Manuf Manuf Retail Retail Finance Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Property Tax Difference −0.367∗∗ −0.300∗∗ −0.365∗∗ −0.294∗∗ −0.354∗∗ −0.282∗ −0.375∗∗ −0.302∗∗
(0.144) (0.147) (0.145) (0.149) (0.148) (0.152) (0.146) (0.149)
Income Tax Difference −0.083∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Capital Gains Tax Difference 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.009 0.020
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Sales Tax Difference −0.102∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Corp Tax Difference 0.020 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.017 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Workers Comp Tax Difference 0.086 0.047 0.094 0.053 0.086 0.048 0.088 0.046
(0.106) (0.103) (0.108) (0.104) (0.110) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104)
Unemp. Tax Difference 0.011 −0.006 0.011 −0.006 0.013 −0.007 0.013 −0.005
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038)
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 0.001∗∗ 0.0004 0.001∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0004∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant −0.062 −0.053 −0.058 −0.049 −0.057 −0.049 −0.064 −0.054
(0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086)
controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
amenities No No No No No No No No
Observations 15,084 15,084 15,609 15,609 16,081 16,081 15,582 15,582
R2 0.038 0.023 0.037 0.023 0.037 0.023 0.036 0.022
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
and clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
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Table B.13 Counties with Income Tax Agreements for Total Firm Births
Dependent variable:
births ratio
Recipricol Recipricol No Recipricol No Recipricol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property Tax Difference 0.293 0.306 −0.319∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.323) (0.160) (0.161)
Income Tax Difference −0.118 −0.201∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.076) (0.026) (0.029)
Capital Gains Tax Difference 0.077∗∗ 0.157∗∗ −0.011 0.024
(0.037) (0.069) (0.023) (0.027)
Sales Tax Difference −0.020 −0.090 −0.106∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗
(0.063) (0.087) (0.031) (0.032)
Corp Tax Difference 0.085∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.027 0.006
(0.042) (0.036) (0.025) (0.025)
Workers Comp Tax Difference 0.382∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.175 0.087
(0.134) (0.183) (0.124) (0.137)
Unemp. Tax Difference −0.086 −0.024 0.005 −0.024
(0.074) (0.092) (0.040) (0.043)
Educ Spending Per Cap Diff 0.0003 −0.00002 −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Highway Spending Per Cap Diff −0.001 −0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Welfare Spending Per Cap Diff 0.001∗∗ 0.0003 0.0004 0.001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Constant −0.071 −0.218 −0.011 −0.041
(0.229) (0.171) (0.079) (0.094)
controls Yes No Yes No
amenities Yes No Yes No
Observations 2,850 2,850 10,265 10,265
R2 0.151 0.063 0.131 0.059
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
and clustered standard errors at the state-pair level.
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Table B.14 F-Tests for Recipricol Agreement Joint Tax and Expenditure Effects
Test F-Stat P(>F)
Recipricol, No Amenities, No Controls Taxes 0.4536 0.5007
Recipricol, No Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 0.5644 0.4526
Recipricol, Amenities, Controls Taxes 1.9347 0.5007
Recipricol, Amenities, Controls Expenditures 0.0196 0.4526
Non-Recip, No Amenities, No Controls Taxes 5.6154 0.0178
Non-Recip, No Amenities, No Controls Expenditures 5.3559 0.0207
Non-Recip, Amenities, Controls Taxes 12.0609 5e-04
Non-recip, Amenities, Controls Expenditures 4.9544 0.026
Table B.15 Correlation Between Industry Firm Entry
Total Agriculture Manufacturing Retail Trade Finance and insurance
Total 1 0.991 0.992 0.994 0.994
Agriculture 0.991 1 0.993 0.990 0.991
Manufacturing 0.992 0.993 1 0.988 0.990
Retail Trade 0.994 0.990 0.988 1 0.991
Finance and insurance 0.994 0.991 0.990 0.991 1
Table B.16 Result Comparison for Total Firm Births
mean firm entry preffered side abs weighted tax preferred side same? sub state nbr state
2.591 nbr 0.010 sub different kansas nebraska
2.260 nbr 0.016 nbr same maryland west virginia
2.194 sub 0.294 sub same alabama georgia
2.126 sub 0.205 nbr different minnesota wisconsin
1.808 sub 0.097 nbr different ohio pennsylvania
1.743 sub 0.555 sub same colorado kansas
1.568 nbr 0.105 nbr same arizona nevada
1.513 nbr 0.256 sub different idaho utah
1.477 sub 0.119 sub same oklahoma texas
1.376 nbr 0.015 nbr same kentucky west virginia
Table B.17 Result Comparison for Estimated Firm Enry
mean firm entry preffered side abs weighted tax preferred side same? sub state nbr state
0.913 nbr 1.018 sub different delaware new jersey
0.864 sub 0.998 sub same new hampshire vermont
0.477 sub 0.719 sub same maine new hampshire
0.033 sub 0.655 nbr different nebraska wyoming
0.219 nbr 0.637 nbr same delaware pennsylvania
0.763 sub 0.636 sub same montana north dakota
1.146 nbr 0.608 nbr same delaware maryland
0.297 nbr 0.565 nbr same idaho wyoming
0.295 nbr 0.558 nbr same california oregon
1.743 sub 0.555 sub same colorado kansas
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